Surrendering to Separatism: How Europe Lost in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Again

For Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a country plagued by ethnonationalist separatism, the US has always been more than an ally. It was the guarantor of its survival. When Europe hesitated or looked away, Washington acted. At the same time, this American determination split domestic politics along the line between those who supported and those who opposed international interventionism. Those who relied on it grew lethargic and fatalistic: why fight for a different country when the Americans are on your side and always decide in the end? Those who opposed it saw the international presence as the main obstacle to their ambitions. Either way, all sides organized their politics around the American presence. President Trump's second term changed this calculus. For years, the fear in Sarajevo was that Washington's declining interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina would one day reach zero. No one considered the possibility that American power might switch sides altogether. Now the unimaginable seems to have happened. What does a future in which the US has "surrendered to separatism"[1] look like? And what does this mean for Europe, whose entire strategy in its neighborhood was built on American power underwriting it?

The Problem of Borrowed Power

The postwar state-building effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been defined by two principal international actors: the United States and the EU. Both shared the same vision of what the country should eventually become, but differed on how to get there. In a nutshell, the European approach was to enable domestic elites to reach consensus; the US preferred more direct action, imposed when necessary through the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Often contradictory and at times detrimental to the shared aim, the two approaches nonetheless served one goal: a stable and, if possible, democratic country capable of reaching EU membership. And the OHR played a crucial role in both cases.

The High Representative is unlike almost any other international position. Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitution, essentially a peace settlement, vested enormous executive power in a single appointed official, who answers to the Peace Implementation Council. The PIC is an ad hoc group of states that directs the mandate of the OHR through its Steering Board. Those powers, formalized in Bonn in 1997 and known since then as the Bonn Powers, let the High Representative impose laws and dismiss officials by decree. At its height that power was wielded without apology. In June 2004, Paddy Ashdown removed sixty officials in a single day[2]. But for years the influence of the OHR had been waning.

All of that changed with Christian Schmidt. The German politician was installed at the head of the OHR without UN Security Council endorsement in August 2021.[3] Russia and China rejected his legitimacy outright. The appointment was a German-led EU move to preserve international oversight of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a moment when Russian influence in the Western Balkans was expanding and a security crisis on the EU's border was no longer unthinkable. The target was clear: Milorad Dodik, at the time the Serb member of the tripartite presidency and Moscow's closest ally in the country.

For years, the fear in Sarajevo was that Washington's declining interest would one day reach zero. No one considered the possibility that American power might switch sides altogether.

Dodik, who had spent years methodically looking for ways to discredit and dismantle the country’s postwar architecture, immediately recognized the threat. He attacked Schmidt from the start, personally and politically. Their clash reached its peak when Dodik moved from rhetoric to action. He pushed secessionist legislation through the Assembly of Republika Srpska (RS), defying state institutions, constructing the legal scaffolding of a parallel state[4]. Schmidt annulled the laws, but the National Assembly refused to accept the decision. Schmidt imposed a law that criminalized the non-execution of OHR decisions[5]. The RS Assembly refused to comply, and Bosnia's courts convicted Dodik[6]. Washington sanctioned him under President Biden[7]. For the first time in his career, he was genuinely cornered.

Washington Switches Sides

Donald Trump's reelection changed everything. Like other regional strongmen, primarily former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić, Dodik had high hopes. But while Trump's support couldn't save Orbán, and the US President’s relationship with Vučić remains complicated, Dodik knew exactly how to make it work. He understood that the defining attribute of the new administration was transactionalism[8]. And Dodik had something to offer: political support for the Southern Interconnection pipeline, a gas infrastructure project designed to diminish Bosnia's reliance on Russian gas. The project, worth more than a billion dollars, was awarded by the Parliament of the Federation of BiH (FBiH) to a single American company. No tender, no competition. A clear violation of the EU's Energy Community rules[9]. That company, AAFS Infrastructure and Energy, was incorporated in Wyoming on November 24, 2025, only four days after US Embassy officials discussed an American firm building the pipeline[10]. Its director is Jesse Binnall, Trump's personal attorney during the 2020 election challenge. Its vice-president is Joseph Flynn, brother of Michael Flynn, Trump's pardoned former National Security Adviser and the key figure in getting Dodik's sanctions lifted[11]. The company had no experience building pipelines.

In Bosnia's deliberately complex institutional setup, the question of who owns state land is essentially the question of who owns the state. It has gone unresolved ever since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. High Representative Ashdown froze it in 2005 and it stayed that way for two decades. But in late 2023, the government of the FBiH granted the British mining company Adriatic Metals usage rights over state forest in the small town of Vareš[12]. In practice, this meant that disposition of state property could be decided at the entity level. The move by the FBiH government was supported by Schmidt, but the Constitutional Court struck it down either way. Now Schmidt threatened that he would solve the question of property once and for all, and there were signals his solution would be a state-level commission that would decide on a case-by-case basis. A state-level solution would certainly force Dodik to escalate and potentially leave state institutions, which would endanger the whole pipeline project. It would also expose the deal to international oversight. The entity-level decision, on the other hand, risked only being struck down by the Constitutional Court, in a country where court decisions are routinely ignored. And with both the FBiH government and Dodik on board, Schmidt was the only obstacle left.

What Europe Lost

Within weeks he was gone. Schmidt initially called it a personal decision, but he later acknowledged "enormous and unexpected pressure from the United States" behind his early departure[13]. What makes this more than a forceful personnel change is the fact that a post-conflict architecture maintained for decades can be effectively unraveled in a matter of months for particular commercial interests.

The American move cut against both Russian and European interests, but politically, Moscow had a lot to gain and Brussels everything to lose. Russia might have given up a small gas customer, but it gained one of the clearest examples of Western peace architecture dismantled in practice. Brussels, on the other hand, was left completely empty-handed. It threatened to cut a billion euros in aid and to freeze the accession process itself[14]. That did not work. In one swift move, the Trump administration had stripped Brussels of its ability to assert political control, economic influence, or diplomatic pressure. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not an isolated case either. According to reporting, the government in Romania collapsed amid pressure from a US ambassador to lock in American LNG through a favored intermediary[15]. Different country, same mechanism, and a direct line to Ukraine.

Schmidt could be Bosnia's last High Representative. The one the US forced to resign, and the one neither Berlin nor Brussels could save.

The OHR continues to exist under an acting High Representative, the American Louis Crishock, who served as Principal Deputy High Representative under Schmidt[16]. The PIC Steering Board met in Sarajevo on two occasions to name Schmidt's replacement and failed to do so both times[17]. The US Embassy in Sarajevo tweeted open threats to completely leave the process if the Europeans kept pushing for their candidate[18]. While the ultimate fate of the OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina is yet to be decided, its legitimacy has been completely eroded. More than thirty years of international management in Bosnia left the country with a disoriented pro-Bosnian bloc and empowered secessionists. On October 4, citizens go to the polls for general elections, with the OHR's legitimacy and capacity to act more uncertain than ever.

It is hard to imagine that the country will get another High Representative with enough support from the PIC to ever use the Bonn Powers again. The more likely scenario is that Schmidt will be Bosnia's last High Representative. The one the US forced to resign and the one that neither Berlin nor Brussels could save. The lesson is one Europe should have learned in the 1990s: it cannot rely on instruments it does not control. The configuration has shifted, but the dynamic remains the same. In Bosnia, Europe found out the limits of power built by someone else. And the same players, at the same table, might decide the fate of Ukraine as well.

Photo credit: Pexels.com

[1] William R. Keating, Pay for Play in the Balkans: How the Trump Administration's Bosnia Policy Enriches the President's Personal Allies and Shortchanges the American People, House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority, Subcommittee on Europe, 119th Congress, September 15, 2026.

[2] Ron Synovitz, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Decision to Sack 60 Bosnian Serb Officials Marks Major Escalation of Int'l Pressure," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 1, 2004.

[3] UN Security Council, "Security Council Turns Down Resolution That Would End Powers of Bosnia and Herzegovina High Representative" (8823rd Meeting, SC/14585), July 22, 2021.

[4] Stefano Fella, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secessionism in the Republika Srpska, House of Commons Library Research Briefing Number 10013, December 12, 2025.

[5] Office of the High Representative, Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 1, 2023.

[6] Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Otpremljena drugostepena presuda u predmetu protiv optuženih Milorada Dodika i Miloša Lukića, August 1, 2025.

[7] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Milorad Dodik and Associated Media Platform for Destabilizing and Corrupt Activity, January 5, 2022.

[8] Christophe Lesschaeve and Donada Rata, "The Greenland Warning: Preparing for a Post-NATO World," European Strategy Institute Luxembourg, April 22, 2026.

[9] Predrag Zvijerac and Gjeraqina Tuhina, "EU Warns Bosnia US Gas Project Could Threaten 1 Billion Euros in Aid," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 25, 2026.

[10] Keating, Pay for Play in the Balkans.

[11] Christian Edwards, "US Lifts Sanctions on Putin-Backed Bosnian Serb Strongman After Trump Allies' Lobbying," CNN, October 30, 2025.

[12] Vlada Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka o promjeni namjene šumskog zemljišta i privremenom korištenju šumskog zemljišta u druge namjene, 20th session, November 15, 2023.; Sanja Mlađenović Stević, “In Bosnia, a Mine Is Devastating Forests and Dividing the Country,” Voxeurop, July 22, 2025.

[13] Daria Sito-Sucic, "Bosnia Seeks New Peace Envoy After Sudden Schmidt Exit," Reuters, June 3, 2026.

[14] Zvijerac and Tuhina, "EU Warns Bosnia US Gas Project Could Threaten 1 Billion Euros in Aid."

[15] Nektaria Stamouli, "Greek Opposition Jabs Ruling Party Over Reported Threats From Trump’s Envoy," Politico Europe, September 29, 2026.

[16] Office of the High Representative, Statement of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, June 30, 2026.

[17]AFP with Euractiv, "US Diplomat Named Acting Bosnia Envoy," Euractiv, July 1, 2026.

[18] Amanda Thorpe and Olivia Olson, "Bosnia's High Representative Succession Dispute Exposes a Deeper Transatlantic Rift," Atlantic Council, August 19, 2026.