Strategic Notes
Author
Christophe Lesschaeve
Published on: May 5th 2026
Publication
Why does Europe remain vulnerable to energy crises despite decades of planning and diversification? In this ESILUX Strategic Note, Christophe Lesschaeve argues that the problem is not a lack of options, but a recurring pattern in how Europe responds to pressure. When disruptions hit, the European Union falls back on short-term fixes, replacing one dependency with another rather than reducing exposure. From this perspective, the current crisis is not exceptional. It reflects a longer trajectory. Fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and renewables each offer partial solutions, but they do not carry the same kind of risk. Dependencies tied to fossil fuels and uranium are continuous and rooted in geography. Those linked to renewables are different. They stem more from policy choices and can, to a greater extent be managed. The danger for Europe is to treat these dependencies as equivalent and to respond as it has before. Europe is not facing an energy crisis, but a dependency trap. Short-term fixes only deepen it.
Download PDFEurope is once again staring down the barrel of a major energy crisis. The most recent escalation of hostilities between the United States, Israel and Iran has shown how quickly geopolitical developments can raise energy prices. Knowing that it cannot match the US and Israel in conventional warfare, Iran has opted to exert pressure by targeting fossil fuel facilities in the Gulf states and effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz. This is the second major European energy crisis in recent years, and it exposes a critical flaw in the EU’s approach to energy policy. There is a wide gap between its ambitious long-term plans and the inability to stick to them. Europe has long-term strategies, like the Green New Deal and REPowerEU, to reduce fossil fuel dependence. Yet when difficulties arise, and especially when a crisis hits, the bloc tends to fall back on short-term fixes.
Strategy Without Commitment
After the oil shocks of the 1970s, Europe bet big on nuclear power. Then Chernobyl shifted public and political opinion, and after Fukushima, most of the continent doubled down on renewables, using Russian natural gas as a bridge. However, when Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that bridge burned. Europe has since turned to LNG imports, particularly from the United States, only to find that it has replaced one dependency with another.[1] Currently, three main strategies dominate the debate to end Europe’s energy woes: 1) prolonged reliance on fossil fuels; 2) nuclear renaissance: extending the life of old reactors, and constructing new ones; and 3) focus on renewables: betting on wind, solar, and hydro to power the continent.
There is a wide gap between its ambitious long-term plans and the inability to stick to them. Europe has long-term strategies, like the Green New Deal and REPowerEU, to reduce fossil fuel dependence. Yet when difficulties arise, and especially when a crisis hits, the bloc tends to fall back on short-term fixes.
While one could dismiss extended reliance on hydrocarbons entirely on environmental grounds, the reasons why it is proposed are understandable. Europe’s energy system is still built around fossil fuels. The entire infrastructure, from refineries to gas pumps and from LNG terminals to gas boilers, is already in place. Unsurprisingly, even before the current energy crisis, Europe’s commitment to its climate goals was shaky.[2] Several governments, including Germany and Italy, had begun to push back against the EU’s planned phase-out of combustion engine vehicles.[3] Ahead of the COP30 climate summit, EU climate ministers agreed to watered down climate goals.[4] And in December 2025, the EU scaled back its corporate sustainability laws.[5] The latest developments have only made things worse. In Germany, far-right parties are openly pushing to reopen the door to Russian gas,[6]and Italy, Poland, and others have already made it clear they want to keep their coal and gas plants running for longer than planned.[7]
Different Paths, Same Dependencies
The idea of keeping fossil fuels in the mix is rooted in the immediate need for energy, but also in the belief that when one source of gas or oil is cut off, Europe will find another. Yet recent crises have shown how quickly energy flows can be disrupted and even weaponized. While continued reliance on fossil fuels may offer short-term relief, it locks the European economy into recurring price shocks and uncertainty. The longer Europe clings to fossil fuels, the more exposed it becomes to the inevitable next crisis.
Nuclear power can be part of Europe’s energy solution. It is low-carbon and provides steady baseload power. France’s reactors are central to its energy system, and both the Dutch and Belgian governments have reconsidered their earlier nuclear phase-out plans.[8] However, nuclear energy also presents significant challenges. Europe has an aging fleet of reactors, and building new ones is an unpredictable endeavor in terms of time and cost, as Hinkley Point C in the UK, and Flamanville in France demonstrate. Then there is the issue of dealing with the spent nuclear fuel, and the lengthy decommissioning process that is sometimes slated to be longer than the nuclear reactors have been in operation.
From a strategic perspective, dependence on external uranium suppliers remains a key concern. While Canada is currently the largest supplier to the EU, in 2024 over 50 percent of uranium imports came from Kazakhstan, Russia, Niger, China, and Uzbekistan.[9] Not all of these suppliers can be assumed to be politically neutral or insulated from geopolitical tensions, which raises the risk that supply could be disrupted or used against Europe as leverage.
Most of Europe’s energy policy efforts over the past decade have focused on renewables, and for good reasons. Solar and wind energy offer the most viable pathway for reducing Europe’s exposure to supply shocks in hydrocarbons, even if the potential for renewables is unevenly distributed across the continent. One of the main challenges, however, remains intermittency. Solar and wind production cannot meet demand on a continuous basis, and storage capacity is still insufficient to bridge these gaps. While technical solutions exist, such as grid-scale batteries, they shift the problem to the materials that make renewables possible. The green transition relies on large volumes of critical materials, including lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, most of which are sourced from outside Europe.[10] In addition, the EU imports over 90 percent of its solar panels from China and more than half of its wind turbines from India.[11] Renewables create a different kind of vulnerability, one not to be underestimated. For instance, in 2010, following a diplomatic dispute, China restricted exports of rare earth elements to Japan.[12] More recently in 2025, Beijing used the threat of rare earth export restrictions in its trade war with the US.[13]
However, these dependencies fall into a different category than those suffered in the case of fossil fuels or nuclear energy. In those instances, the dependency is geographical and permanent. Europe lacks the fossil fuels and uranium resources in the quantities required to power its economy. Furthermore, oil and gas imports are burned in engines, boilers, and power plants. Nuclear energy is a bit different in the sense that uranium fuel can be stockpiled and, in some cases, reprocessed. This diminishes the immediacy of supply disruptions. Thus, fossil fuels and nuclear energy, though the latter to a lesser degree, require continuous imports.
That is far less the case for the dependencies related to renewables. The dependence on China and India for solar panels and wind turbines is in the end the result of deliberate policy choices. Should either country halt exports to Europe, it would require adjustment, but the continent could produce many of these technologies domestically if it chooses to do so. Europe also possesses deposits of several critical raw materials required for the energy transition. However, developing these resources involves significant environmental and social costs, which Europe has largely chosen to avoid by relying on imports.[14] More fundamentally, many of the critical raw materials that underpin renewable energy do not disappear after a single use. Unlike fossil fuels or uranium, they can often be recovered, recycled, and reused. This is not to say that the EU could eliminate dependence altogether. Certain inputs would still need to be imported. However, the degree of dependence would be significantly lower and, crucially, more manageable.
Managing Exposure, Not Escaping It
Europe’s energy transition is not about eliminating all dependencies, but about managing them intelligently. To do so, European and EU policy should avoid slowing down let alone reversing the push for renewables. Fossil fuels are not a long-term solution, either environmentally or strategically. At the same time, Europe must accept that its future energy system will be mixed. Renewable energy such as wind and solar should play a dominant and central role, but it will need to be complemented by other sources, primarily nuclear, especially in regions of the continent with lower renewable potential. This also requires integrating energy policy with foreign policy. Supply chains are not neutral, and Europe should prioritize suppliers that pose no strategic risk in the foreseeable future such as Canada or Australia.
Europe’s energy future will not be shaped by new pipelines, reactors, or solar panels alone. It will be shaped by the choices Europe makes today.
Diversification alone, however, is not enough. Europe must also ensure that once critical materials enter its economy, they do not leave. Recovery targets should be mandatory, and more ambitious than those set out in the Critical Raw Materials Act and RESourceEU. This also requires acknowledging that renewables generate their own waste. Components such as wind turbine blades are difficult to recycle and will pose increasing environmental challenges as installations reach the end of their lifecycle. Managing this waste must become an integral part of Europe’s energy strategy, both to limit its environmental impact and to reduce future need for material extraction.
Europe’s energy future will not be shaped by new pipelines, reactors, or solar panels alone. It will be shaped by the choices Europe makes today. Those choices must prioritize resilience over expediency, control over exposure, and the discipline to follow through on them.
Photo credit: Pexels
[1] Hannah Lentschig et al., Europe’s Selective Blindness on Gas: US LNG and the Limits of Supply Diversification (Clingendael Institute, 2026).
[2] Luisa Marelli et al., Delivering the EU Green Deal - Progress towards Targets (Publications Office of the European Union, 2025).
[3] Marta Didonfrancesco, “Italy to Present Proposal for Early Review of EU Combustion Engine Ban,” Reuters, September 23, 2024; Lisa O’Carroll and Jakub Krupa, “Germany to Urge EU to Soften 2035 Ban on Sale of New Petrol and Diesel Cars,” The Guardian, November 28, 2025.
[4] Kate Abnett et al., “EU Agrees Weakened Climate Target in Final-Hour Deal for COP30,” Reuters, November 5, 2025.
[5] Mrinmay Dey et al., “EU Strikes Deal to Weaken Corporate Sustainability Laws,” Reuters, December 9, 2025.
[6] John O’Donnell et al., “Soaring Fuel Prices Drive German Far-Right Calls for a Turn Back to Russia,” Reuters, March 31, 2026.
[7] Reuters, “Italy to Postpone Shutdown of Coal-Powered Plants by 13 Years,” Reuters, March 31, 2026; Marek Strzelecki, “Poland Needs Coal Plant Subsidies beyond 2028, Energy Official Says,” Reuters, March 19, 2024; POLITICO, “Brussels Unveils Emergency Change to EU Carbon Market to Prevent Soaring Prices,” POLITICO, April 1, 2026.
[8] Reuters, “Netherlands Plans to Build Two Nuclear Power Plants by 2035,” Reuters, December 9, 2022; Reuters, “EU Approves State Aid to Extend Life of Engie’s Belgian Nuclear Reactors,” Reuters, February 21, 2025.
[9] Euratom Supply Agency, “Market Observatory - Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy Community,” accessed April 7, 2026.
[10] S. Carrara et al., Supply Chain Analysis and Material Demand Forecast in Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU: A Foresight Study (Publications Office of the European Union, 2023).
[11] Eurostat, “EU Imports €14.6 Billion in Green Energy Products,” October 9, 2025.
[12] Reuters, “China Lifts Rare Earth Export Ban to Japan: Trader,” Reuters, September 29, 2010.
[13] Andy Home, “China Primes Rare Earths Weapon as Trade War Escalates,” Reuters, April 10, 2025.
[14] Jacques Delors Centre, “The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Predicament: ReSourceEU to the Rescue?,” accessed April 7, 2026.
