The Cost of Ambiguity: When Hedging No Longer Works

On February 24, 2022, the world froze as Russian troops crossed the border into Ukraine.[1] The reaction from the EU was one of strength and determination.[2] The act was an aggression against a sovereign state and a clear violation of international law, and it would be treated as such. Europe was unified against a state that had placed itself beyond the rules-based order.[3] Exactly four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States launched a military campaign alongside Israel against Iran, in another case of defiance of international law, even if of a different character.[4] This time, however, very few European countries protested openly. Beyond isolated voices such as Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez,[5] the rest of European leaders remained largely silent and avoided direct criticism, ostensibly in an effort to maintain some semblance of neutrality.[6]Their silence, however, is not a neutral act, and any attempt to present it as such undermines Europe’s internal unity and, over time, its external power projection.

Gradual Weakening of Transatlantic Order

For decades, Europe has been building and strengthening its role as the global rulemaker. While its economic capacity and military power often lagged behind both its allies and its rivals, European political and diplomatic influence was considerable and growing. This unique strategic position was shaped by the lessons learned from the catastrophic decisions of the first half of the twentieth century.[7] The transatlantic order took shape over decades before settling into a formula: US hard power combined with European normative legitimacy. The division of roles was mutually reinforcing and highly beneficial to both. But this fruitful partnership, which rested on a shared understanding that the US would act in constitutionally predictable ways,[8] did not remain static. The US tendency to act outside established norms ran back through at least the Cold War, but the attacks of September 11, 2001 accelerated and normalized it, gradually transforming the transatlantic alliance. At the same time, Europe's dependence on US protection deepened rather than diminished in a world of asymmetric threats and global terrorist networks. Yet the order survived despite strong indications that something was changing (France and Germany's objection to the Iraq invasion in 2003 being the most notable).[9]

The Limits of Alliance

What truly exposed the limits of this hedging was the aftermath of the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023. The United States provided immediate support to Israel, including its military response in Gaza. But the offensive Israel unleashed against Gaza stood in clear opposition to the values upon which the order was built. For European governments, this became a predicament that could not be ignored or dissolved by carefully constructed diplomatic statements. And the pressure was only growing internally as well. Across European cities, from Berlin and Paris to Barcelona and Milan, large numbers of protesters demanded that their governments take a clear stance on Palestine and Israel's actions.[10]

Three distinct approaches consolidated: a normative camp, an order-preservation camp, and a security-dependence camp. All three are driven by concerns for Europe's future, but they diverge on how that future should be secured.

The intensity of Israel's military operation in Gaza, the scale of the humanitarian crisis, and a visibly agitated domestic population made the choice ever more pressing.Key member states, Germany and France, along with the Baltic states and Poland, maintained close relationships with the United States and support for Israel, including direct military cooperation in the domain of intelligence.[11] Others, most notably Spain and Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, Slovenia and Luxembourg, placed greater emphasis on humanitarian concerns and the need to uphold international law.[12] What emerged was not simply a division among EU countries, but a pattern reflecting how member states weighed security and strategic alignment against normative commitment.

Three distinct approaches consolidated: a normative camp, an order-preservation camp, and a security-dependence camp. All three are driven by concerns for Europe's future, but they diverge on how that future should be secured. The normative camp insists on remaining committed to Europe's identity rooted in values; the order-preservation camp seeks to salvage the transatlantic order, banking on a political recalibration in Washington; the security-dependence camp places deterrence and reliance on US military power above all else. The choice between the three is one Europe can no longer postpone. What appears as division within the EU is, in fact, a set of structured nation-state-level responses to a deeper transformation within the transatlantic order itself that are grounded in distinct circumstances. And these responses have been developing for decades. Trump's re-election in 2024 certainly cast a new light on the existing contradictions, but it did not create them.[13]

The Real Threat

The Russian threat made the decision on Europe’s foreign policy more pressing and consequential than ever before. This strengthens the position of those prioritizing defence and a close relationship with the United States. After all, it is hard to argue with those closest to Russia that security concerns should take second place to political ones. But this comes at a cost. The rapid rearmament being undertaken without political clarity deepens divergence internally and signals disunity outwards. Militarization is proceeding at the national level, uneven, and without a clear EU-level approach.[14] Even if Europe succeeds in this colossal attempt to restart its military capacity overnight, military power alone cannot maintain a political union. That sense of union is being politically hollowed out by both the radical right and the radical left, albeit for different motives.The withering trust in Europe’s commitment to global good fuelled by Russian propaganda and Moscow’s support for radical political movements across the continent[15] accelerates the instability. And all of it is unfolding in an environment of rapid polarization, unstable governing coalitions, and a fragmented electorate.[16]

A Political Answer

The liberal-democratic European core, and its mainstream political institutions, depend on a durable consensus. Without a clear position on US military adventurism, Europe remains vulnerable and weak. What continues to unfold in Gaza exposes the limits to Europe’s ambiguity. The US move against Iran systematically removed ambiguity as a viable option. Europe's reluctance to take a clear position on how the US now wields force provides a ready-made narrative of elite hypocrisy that mainstream politics cannot easily counteract. And it is a narrative that is resonating with EU citizens.[17]

The geopolitical power of Europe comes from its internal unity. Any strategist who treats that unity as a luxury to be spent is not a realist but simply a bad strategist.

The question at the heart of the European predicament is no longer simply whether Europe can defend itself, but what kind of Europe is being defended. The threat from Russia, while real and tangible, is not yet existential. The internal political radicalization, by contrast, is only accelerating. Whether internal fragmentation outweighs the external security threat is up for debate, but the choice is not binary. These problems are intertwined, and both demand hard decisions and real costs, not ambiguity. The danger of systematically surrendering internal cohesion for an appearance of strategic clarity is ultimately a categorical error. The geopolitical power of Europe comes from its internal unity. Any strategist who treats that unity as a luxury to be spent is not a realist but simply a bad strategist.

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[1] BBC News, “Ukraine Conflict: Russian Forces Attack from Three Sides,” BBC News, February 24, 2022.

[2] Calle Håkansson, “Understanding the European Union’s Response to the Russian War on Ukraine: The Role of the European External Action Service,” Defence Studies 25, no. 4 (2025).

[3] European Commission, “Press Statement by President von der Leyen on Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine,” European Commission, February 24, 2022.

[4] Tom Bateman and Imogen James, "International Law Experts Allege Violations in Iran War," BBC News, 3 April 2026.

[5] Elena Sánchez Nicolás, “Europe’s Voice of Moral Sense Speaks Spanish,” EUobserver, March 3, 2026.

[6] James Angelos, "Germany's Merz Stresses Dire Risks of Iran Strikes but Won't 'Lecture' US," Politico Europe, 1 March 2026; Rosie Birchard, “Iran War: Will Europe’s Split on US Strikes Backfire?,” Deutsche Welle, 2026.

[7] Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–258.

[8] Josip Glaurdić, “From Asset to Liability: Europe’s Security Dependence on America,” European Strategy Institute Luxembourg, April 15, 2026.

[9] Philip H. Gordon, “The Crisis in the Alliance,” Brookings Institution, February 24, 2003.

[10] Prasanta Kumar Dutta, “Protests Sweep around the Globe as Israel’s War in Gaza Grinds On,” Reuters, November 13, 2023; Le Monde with AFP, “Rallies across Europe to Protest Israel’s Interception of Gaza Flotilla,” Le Monde, October 3, 2025.

[11] Kristian Alexander, “Europe Has Become a Strategic Spectator in the Iran War,” LSE EUROPP, March 30, 2026.

[12] Eliza Gkritsi, “How Every EU Country Responded to the Strikes on Iran,” Politico, March 1, 2026.

[13] Jon Bateman and Oona A. Hathaway, “Did Trump Kill International Law – Or Was It Already Dead?,” The World Unpacked, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 13, 2026.

[14] Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “The Governance and Funding of European Rearmament,” Bruegel, April 2025.

[15] European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution on Russiagate: Allegations of Russian Interference in the Democratic Processes of the European Union,” European Parliament, February 5, 2024.

[16] Marina Nord, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, and Staffan I. Lindberg, Democracy Report 2025: 25 Years of Autocratization – Democracy Trumped?, V-Dem Institute, March 2025.

[17] Pawel Zerka, “The EU’s Quarter-Life Crisis,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 6, 2026.